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Abstract: Intellectual property treaties have two main types of provi-
sions: national treatment of foreign inventors, and harmonization of protec-
tions. I characterize the circumstances in which countries would want to treat
foreign inventors the same as national inventors. I then argue that national
treatment of foreign inventors leads to stronger intellectual property protec-
tion than is optimal, and that this e®ect is exacerbated when protections
must be harmonized. However levels of public and private R&D spending
will be lower than if each country took account of the uncompensated ex-
ternalities that its R&D spending confers on other countries. The stronger
protection engendered by attempts at harmonization are a partial remedy.
JEL Classi¯cation: F1, L5
Keywords: Intellectual Property, Globalization, TRIPS, treaty
1NBER and Department of Economics and Goldman School of Public Policy, University
of California, Berkeley, 94720-7320, scotch@socrates.berkeley.edu. I would like to thank
Stylianos Tellis for research assistance, and Alan Deardor®, Rich Gilbert, Jean Lanjouw,
Stephen Maurer and Pam Samuelson for helpful comments. I thank the National Science
Foundation for ¯nancial support.
11 Introduction
The economic rationale for intellectual property (IP) is that it encourages
invention for the bene¯t of consumers. There is no economic rationale for
protecting inventors per se. Their pro¯ts count as bene¯ts to the extent that
pro¯t exceeds R&D costs, but pro¯ts are recognized as a necessary evil, since
the °ip side of pro¯t is a loss in consumers' surplus.
This reasoning gets subverted in the international arena. To a trade
policy negotiator, pro¯t earned abroad is unambiguously a good thing: the
more the better. Moreover, consumers' surplus conferred on foreigners by
domestic inventions does not count at all. Because of these distortions, we
would expect intellectual property policies devised by trade negotiators to be
nonoptimal, even if the negotiations are undertaken to satisfy some type of
worldwide treaty. The objective of this paper is to try to understand what
distortions will arise.
Two important provisions of treaties about intellectual property are \na-
tional treatment of foreign inventors" and \harmonization," which might
also be called \globalization." \National treatment" means that within each
country, foreign and domestic inventors receive identical treatment, namely,
the treatment of nationals. A secondary question is whether national treat-
ment will be granted unilaterally, or only on condition of reciprocity by the
foreign country. \Harmonization" refers to provisions by which signatory
states agree to a common set of protections. The ¯rst step toward harmoniza-
tion is usually to state minimum standards, both in the subject matter pro-
tected, and the length of protection. Generally, intellectual property treaties
set minimum protections, not maximum protections, although TRIPS (dis-
cussed below) has provisions that can be understood as constraining intellec-
tual property. For example, it codi¯es the general feature of copyright laws
1that expression can be protected, but not ideas.
My objective in this paper is to understand the rudimentary incentives
to sign intellectual property treaties, and perhaps more importantly, to un-
derstand how intellectual property treaties a®ect national choices about the
strength of protection. Section 2 presents a very short history of intellec-
tual property treaties, with emphasis on national treatment, reciprocity, and
harmonization. Section 3 develops a simple model to expose the incentives
for national treatment, and asks when national treatment will be conditional
on reciprocity. In Section 4, I investigate how domestic intellectual prop-
erty choices are a®ected by treaties that provide for national treatment but
no harmonization, versus treaties with national treatment that also require
harmonization.
The premise of this inquiry is that countries can negotiate only over in-
tellectual property rights (and not, for example, over R&D spending or tari®
policy), and that each country is concerned only with the consumers' surplus
received by its own consumers on domestic and foreign inventions, and with
pro¯t of its ¯rms, earned at home and abroad. In contrast, a planner con-
cerned with global social welfare would be concerned with consumers' surplus
and pro¯t in all countries simultaneously. As pointed out by Hall (2001),
this discrepancy should lead to distortions, and certainly to international
disagreements.
Mymain conclusionis thatintellectual propertyrights will be strongerun-
der a system of harmonized national treatment than is optimal. The stronger
property rights address a problem that arises from international fragmenta-
tion, namely, that each country's spending on R&D will be too low. This is
especially true of R&D undertaken by public sponsors. When inventions are
put in the public domain, domestic taxpayers create uncompensated bene¯ts
2for foreign bene¯ciaries. Politically, that is a hard sell. In contrast, if R&D
is supported by intellectual property rather than public sponsorship, foreign
bene¯ciaries must reimburse at least some of the cost by paying proprietary
prices. The prospect of pro¯t earned abroad gives a natural impetus toward
stronger protection. If there is a policy lesson here, it is that countries would
do better to negotiate treaties for coordinated public spending, all to be put
in the public domain, rather than negotiating treaties to strengthen intellec-
tual property rights, which create an additional burden of high prices. My
conclusions would be even stronger if trade policy negotiators overweighted
the interests of domestic ¯rms, as compared to the interests of domestic con-
sumers. It is thought by many commentators that they do so, especially in
the highly contested realm of pharmaceuticals (e.g., see Lanjouw and Cock-
burn (2000)).
There has been surprisingly little economic analysis of economic treaties.
An important exception is Bagwell and Staiger (1999), who studied how
the provisions in the General Agreement on Tari®s and Trade (GATT) can
remedy ine±cient tari® policies that arise from incentives to protect domestic
interests. The premise of their paper is also the premise here: The policy
of each country creates uncompensated externalities abroad, which might be
remedied by treaty. In their case, the policies are tari®s, which change the
terms of trade. The countries' chosen tari®s will not be optimal because
countries do not account for the externalities. Negotiation under GATT
empowers the countries to remedy that problem for the countries' mutual
bene¯t. In contrast, reciprocity will not remedy the ine±ciencies that arise in
choosing intellectual property rights, because the countries do not negotiate
over all the economic decisions that matter. In particular, they negotiate
over intellectual property rights, but not over R&D spending. In addition,
I assume for this ¯rst investigation that terms-of-trade issues are divorced
from negotiations over intellectual property rights. In reality, small countries
3may be strong-armed into signing IP treaties in order to receive favorable
trading status.
In addition, several authors have addressed the \North/South\ prob-
lem, which is a stylization of asymmetric innovative capacities. One country
(North) has the innovative compacity, and both countries have demand for
new products. The papers have di®ering models, but the lessons in all of them
are rooted in cross-border externalities, as in my own arguments. Inventors
in the North are protected by their domestic IP laws. Through their inven-
tions, they create bene¯ts for the South. If the Northern inventions are not
protected in the South, then the Southerners get the bene¯t of competitive
supply. If the Southerners grant protection, then they get even more new
products (since the inventors have more global protection), but at propri-
etary prices. Deardor® (1992) shows that protection in the South might not
be optimal for either Southerners alone, or for the world as a whole, since the
deadweight loss in the South might outweigh the worldwide bene¯ts of get-
ting more inventions. Diwan and Rodrik (1991) characterize how \strongly"
the North and South will protect the Northern inventions, assuming that
each country is motivated only by its domestic interests, and that the coun-
tries do not make treaties. The South may want di®erent products than the
North, for example, drugs for tropical diseases. To elicit investment in those
products by Northerners, they must grant intellectual property protection in
the South, even though such protection undermines the externalities they get
from other inventions of Northerners. Helpman (1993) introduces other com-
plexities that arise in general equilibrium, such as the fact that it might be
cheaper to produce in one country rather than another. A distortion created
by di®ering intellectual property laws is that production could be shifted to
the less e±cient, but more protective, country. Chin and Grossman (1990)
studied a similar environment, but a di®erent type of intellectual property.
In their model, the invention is a cost-reducing invention, which means that
4piracy reduces the global price. The inventor does not appropriate the full
rewards of his invention, even in his own country, since the product can be
produced with the pirated technology and imported.
In order to study whether the externalities will be internalized through
treaties, I use a simpler model than in most of the cited papers. One of the
questions of interest is how treaty provisions a®ect the extent of protected
subject matter. For that purpose it is more convenient to assume that
countries are alike, rather than to assume they are extremely di®erent, as in
the North/South models.
2 A Short History of IP Treaties
The earliest large-scale intellectual property treaties were the Paris Conven-
tion of 1884 on patents and other industrial property, and the Berne Con-
vention of 1886 for literary and artistic works. Under various revisions, these
treaties have remained in e®ect since their inception, and now have more
than 100 members. Both established the idea of national treatment. The
Berne Convention also made the ¯rst e®orts to harmonize protections across
countries.
For the most part, the principle of national treatment has been main-
tained since the Paris and Berne Conventions. Reciprocity is inherent in the
treaties: No country provides national treatment to foreigners in a coun-
try that does not reciprocate. However, reciprocity has recently been made
a condition for national treatment. When the U.S. enacted the Semicon-
ductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, the protection of foreign inventors was
made conditional on the passage of similar legislation in the foreign countries.
5I n1 9 9 6 ,t h eE u r o p e a nU n i o nr e t a l i a t e dw i t ht h e i rD i r e c t i v eo nD a t a b a s e s ,
which instructs the member states to enact legislation protecting databases
beyond the protection already a®orded by copyright law. The Directive has a
preamble denying national treatment to non-member states (presumably, the
U.S.) unless the nonmember states also enact such legislation. (See McManis
1996.)
A shortcoming of the Paris and Berne Conventions is that they made no
provisions for enforcement. Their modern descendants are administered by
the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), which has very weak
enforcement powers (Mossingho® 1999, Samuelson 1999). Better enforce-
ment provisions were introduced in the North American Free Trade Associa-
tion (NAFTA) and particularly in the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property (TRIPS), as administered by the World Trade Orga-
nization. The latter treaties provide for compulsory third-party arbitration
and other binding procedures.
More importantly for this paper, NAFTA extended national treatment to
all intellectual property, at least on the North American continent. It goes
some distance in harmonizing protections, although not as far as TRIPS.
TRIPS has speci¯c provisions for minimum protection of bioengineered mi-
croorganisms, pharmaceuticals, computer software, and databases, and stip-
ulates minimum durations of protection. It is administered by the World
Trade Organization, which is authorized to carry out very speci¯c enforce-
ment actions that are widely thought to have teeth.
U.S. history is informative about the politics of IP treaties. The consti-
tutional convention of 1789 was an early instance where a disjointed system
of local rights was replaced with a federal system. Each of the 13 found-
ing States had previously granted patents, but all ceded their authority in
6this area to the newly established federal government. The U.S. did not
join the Berne Convention for reciprocal copyright policy until 1989, largely
because it did not want to adopt the required procedures administering copy-
rights. Instead, in the 1950's, the U.S. lobbied for the Universal Copyright
Convention, which, like the Berne Convention, provided for national treat-
ment, but did not have the same requirements for harmonized protections,
procedures, and length of protection. In the more recent attempts at harmo-
nization, the U.S. has been a leader. This is especially true of TRIPS, which
is the most powerful harmonization treaty to date for both patentable and
copyrightable subject matter, as well as providing for an e®ective enforce-
ment regime through the WTO. The U.S. was also very much in favor of
NAFTA. The strengthening of protections abroad under NAFTA and TRIPS
are aligned with American commercial interests.
3 National Treatment
I ¯rst take the protected intellectual property as given in each country, and
consider the incentives to o®er national treatment to foreigners. Suppose
there are two countries, a;w. We shall focus on country a, and sometimes
interpret w as \the rest of the world." For i = a;w; let ci be the aggregate
consumers' surplus per innovation, assuming perfect competition, and let
Ci be the aggregate consumers' surplus per innovation, assuming that the
product is sold by a monopolist. Thus we assume that Ci <c i.L e t¼i be the
aggregate pro¯t per innovation, for each country i = a;w: In each country,
the consumers' surpluses and pro¯ts depend on the size of the market, which
will be large or small, depending on the population. The di®erence ci¡Ci ¡
¼i represents the deadweight loss when a competitively supplied product
becomes proprietary in country i:
7Let (^ ra; ^ rw) be the numbers of proprietary innovations in the two countries
respectively under \autarky", namely, when intellectual property rights are
only available to domestic ¯rms in each country. Let (~ ra; ~ rw)b et h en u m b e r s
of innovations when each country grants rights to foreign ¯rms as well as
to domestic ¯rms (\national treatment"). Since national treatment creates
additional incentives for inventors, ~ ra ¸ ^ ra and ~ rw ¸ ^ rw: 2
We ¯rst investigate whether it would be in the interest of any country
to o®er national treatment to foreigners even when the foreign country does
not reciprocate. By doing so, the country would generate pro¯t for foreign
inventors at the expense of its own consumers, who could otherwise use
the proprietary foreign technologies without paying proprietary prices. On
the other hand, there could be more foreign invention, which would create
bene¯ts for domestic consumers.







which includes pro¯t and (monopoly) consumers' surplus plus the consumers'
surplus generated by a competitive supply of the other country's inventions.
The last term should be understood as an uncompensated externality from
the rest of the world to country a:
Country a would ¯nd it pro¯table to grant national treatment to inventors












2I implicitly assume that each inventor's incentive to invent only depends on the extent
of his own property rights. This is a reasonable approximation for my purposes here, but








If ~ rw is su±ciently large, or if ^ rw is su±ciently small, national treatment
of foreigners will bene¯t consumers in country a. Even though the national
rights will cause them to pay proprietary prices instead of competitive prices
for the innovations made in the other country, the increase in such inventions
may outweigh the loss in consumers' surplus on each invention
It is reasonable to think that the lefthand side, but not the righthand
side, of (2) re°ects the size of county a. Suppose, for example, that every
resident of a receives the same consumer's surplus under competitive supply
and with proprietary prices, respectively. Then the righthand side is the
ratio of consumer's surpluses for every individual consumer per innovation
as well as for the country as a whole, and it is bounded above 1. But the
lefthand side is larger than 1 by the fractional increase in innovation abroad
if country a grants property rights. It is reasonable to think that the increase
will be greater if country a is large, and that the lefthand side ratio will be
close to 1 if country a is small. Thus, a small, open economy will be reluctant
to provide national treatment to foreign inventors, although a large country
might do so unilaterally. Since this should be clear, I have not written down
a formal assumption in stating the proposition below. The terms \large" and
\small" in Proposition 1(ii) must be interpreted such that the inequality (2)
does and does not hold, respectively.
It is easy to verify that (2) is the condition for country a to grant national
treatment even if country a is already favored with rights in the rest of the














9which again reduces to (2). Thus,
Proposition 1 (Independent choices about National Treatment )
(i) A country's incentive to grant national treatment to foreign ¯rms does not
depend directly on whether the foreign country is reciprocating. It depends
only on the amount of research that would thus be engendered, compared to
the loss in consumers' surplus on each invention.
(ii) A small open economy will typically not ¯nd it advantageous to grant
national treatment to foreign inventors, although a large economy would do
so.
As documented inSection 2, most IP treaties includesmall, openeconomies.
This seems to contradict part (ii) of the proposition. The reason is illumi-
nated in the next section. Although small open economies would not uni-
laterally decide to grant national treatment to foreigners, they may do so in
return for reciprocity. Reciprocity is a powerful motivating force.
A second reason, not discussed here, is that small open economies are
often strong-armed into granting IP rights by the threat of trade sanctions
from their larger trading partners. I have left trade sanctions out of this
paper in order to assess what can be said about negotiations on intellectual
property rights alone. However, an interpretation of Proposition 1(ii) is that
trade sanctions might have to be invoked if large countries want national
rights in small countries.
103.1 Reciprocity
According to the above argument, it could easily happen that the large coun-
try ¯nds it advantageous to grant national treatment, but a small country
does not. Of course the large country would be even better o® if the small
country reciprocated, since that would increase the pro¯t of its own ¯rms
marketing abroad. We now turn to the question of whether there is any
power in the threat to withold national treatment of foreign inventors in the
absence of reciprocity.
Above I answered the question: Given that a large economy has made a
unilateral decision to grant national rights to foreign inventors, does a small
foreign country have an incentive to reciprocate? We now ask: Supposing
that a large economy will only grant national rights under a reciprocal ar-
rangement, will a small foreign country agree to a reciprocal arrangement
rather than autarky?
I again assume that the protected intellectual property in each country
is given. I again use (^ ra; ^ rw) to represent the amount of innovation under
autarky, and use (¹ ra; ¹ rw) to represent the amount of innovation with a re-
ciprocal agreement. If there are only two nations, (¹ ra; ¹ rw)=( ~ ra; ~ rw). If w
represents many nations, then the reciprocal agreement involves reciprocity
among those nations as well as between those nations and a .C o n s e q u e n t l y
there will be more stimulus to innovation. Reciprocal national treatment is

























where the righthand side of (3) is the welfare of country a with reciprocal
national treatment and the lefthand side is the welfare of country a under
11an autarkic system. In the two-country case, where (¹ ra; ¹ rw)=( ~ ra; ~ rw), the
righthand side of (3) is larger than the righthand side of (1) by amount ¹ ra¼w.
This is the pro¯t that can be earned abroad if national treatment comes with
reciprocity. Thus, in the two-country case, reciprocity will never discourage
country a from granting national treatment, and it may tip the balance so
that country a prefers national treatment.
By adding the two inequalities (3), we see that, if the two countries agree
to reciprocal national treatment, then the agreement enhances social welfare.
They cannot have \too strong" an incentive to make such an agreement; if
the agreement would decrease social welfare, at least one of the countries
would oppose it.3
I now show that reciprocal national treatment can only be in the interest
of both parties if it increases incentives to innovate substantially. Assume to
the contrary that the amount of innovation is not very responsive to national
treatment, that is, (^ ra; ^ rw)~ =(¹ ra; ¹ rw). Then reciprocal national treatment
improves the welfare of a and w respectively if
^ r
a¼










For country a,t h ev a r i a b l e s^ ra; ¹ ra are a measure of its innovative sector,
and ca;Ca are a measure of its consumption sector. Reciprocity bene¯ts local
innovators by allowing them to collect pro¯t ¼w in country w, but burdens
local consumers, who will have to pay proprietary prices for inventions made
abroad. This imposes deadweight loss in amount (ca ¡ Ca). Thus, unless
3Compare with the conclusions of Deardor® (1992). Deardor® showed that reciprocity
can decrease social welfare, but did not ask whether the countries would agree to it.
12national treatment increases the incentive to innovate by a great deal, it
will reduce social welfare, and at least one of the countries will oppose it.
By adding (4) and the next inequality, it is clear that the two inequalities
contradict the fact that 0 <c i¡Ci¡¼i;i= a;w (deadweight loss is positive):
For example, suppose that the two countries have the same size markets
(ca;Ca;¼ a)=( cw;Cw;¼ w); and the same responsiveness to increased R&D
incentives, ¹ ra = m^ ra and ¹ rw = m^ rw, m>1, and that one country is more
innovative than the other, e.g., ^ ra > ^ rw: Then it follows from (3) that if only
one country favors reciprocal national treatment to autarky, it will be the
more innovative country. The pro¯t that the innovative country can earn
abroad on its many innovations will outweigh the deadweight loss that arises
by making the other country's innovations proprietary. The less innovative
country will reason that if it agrees to reciprocal national treatment, it loses
the competitive supply of the innovative country's innovations, a valuable
externality. The relatively modest proprietary rights it can obtain through
national treatment will not outweigh this loss to its own consumers.
It is also easy to see that intellectual property treaties are likely to arise






We argued that the analogous condition (2) for unilateral choices will typi-
cally not hold for a small country. In contrast, (5) is likely to hold because
the alternative to autarky is reciprocal national treatment rather than uni-
lateral national treatment. The reason for this discrepancy is that ¹ rw is much
larger than ~ rw. Recall that ~ rw is the amount of innovation promoted abroad
if country a unilaterally decides to grant national treatment to foreigners.
But ¹ rw is the amount of innovation abroad if country a,t o g e t h e rw i l la l l
the other small countries, reciprocally and jointly decide to grant national
13treatment. The latter will obviously generate a much larger stimulus to in-
novation, as each innovator in each country suddenly gets proprietary rights
in the joint markets of all the small countries, not just in country a.P a r t
(iii) of the following Proposition can be argued formally by observing that
for a federation of many small countries, each country's rate of innovation ^ r
will be close to zero under autarkic rights, and and positive under reciprocal
national treatment. If the number of such countries is large, condition (5)
will hold.
Proposition 2 (Reciprocal National Treatment)
(i) If a country has incentive to provide national treatment to foreign inven-
tors without reciprocity, then it would also favor a reciprocal agreement to do
so.
(ii) Unless reciprocal national treatment leads to more proprietary innova-
tions and higher social welfare than autarky, at least one country will oppose
it.
(iii) Reciprocal national treatment of foreign inventors will be favored by every
member of a federation of \small" nations that are commensurately innova-
tive, even though none would unilaterally grant such treatment.
As mentioned in the introduction, an early example of small states com-
bining their intellectual property regimes was the U.S. Constitution. In
stitching together the States to form a federal government, the founding
fathers had to resolve which level of government would have the power to
grant intellectual property rights. All of the States had already exercised
this power. Presumably for the reasons given here, the issue was resolved
in favor of the federal government. A system of autarkic rights devised by
the States would either have given de¯cient incentives, or the de¯cient incen-
tives would have had to be resolved by \treaty" among the states. Another
example with the same °avor is the Paris Convention.
144 Harmonization of Protection
Above I assumed that the extent of intellectual property rights in each coun-
try was given, and asked whether countries have an incentive (i) to provide
national rights to foreign inventors, and (ii) whether the answer is di®erent if
national rights are conditional on reciprocity. But even within the framework
of reciprocal rights, countries argue about what should be protected. For
many years Canada did not grant intellectual property protection for phar-
maceuticals. Instead they had a compulsory licensing law which regulated
the price at which pharmaceuticals in Canada could be sold. The standard
explanation is that Canada did not have a pharmaceutical industry, and
hence had no national interest in protecting pharmaceuticals. Lobbying of
Congress and international bodies by the international drug companies even-
tually convinced the Canadians to rescind this policy, especially since their
participation in NAFTA would depend on it (see Maskus (2001)).
I now address the trend toward harmonization, to see how harmoniza-
tion a®ects the strength of intellectual property rights that will arise. I
assume that countries have signed treaties that specify reciprocal national
treatment. However reciprocal national treatment does not specify what will
be protected. I introduce a variable f in the model below, which represents
what percentage of subject matter will be embraced by various forms of in-
tellectual property. I investigate the levels of protection that will arise when
countries choose this variable independently, and when their choices must be
harmonized. In order to avoid bargaining problems in the case of harmoniza-
tion, and to illustrate most convincingly that these two regimes give truly
di®erent national incentives, I will mostly assume for the comparison that
the two countries are symmetric.
The main endogenous variable in each country will be f,t h ef r a c t i o n
15of subject matter that is protected by intellectual property. An important
secondary variable is the level of R&D spending in each country, which de-
pends on the property rights both domestically and abroad. Let ffi 2 [0;1],
i = a;wg represent the fractions of the subject matter in countries i=a,w
that will be protected intellectual property. As before, w can be interpreted
as the rest of the world. For each of i = a;w, the complement 1¡fi is spon-
sored research, which is funded out of general revenue and put in the public
domain. Any invention in the public domain is available to be competitively
supplied. I let si, i = a;w, represent the total numbers innovations:
The variable si represents both public and private innovation. When fo-
cussing on private incentives provided through intellectual property rights,
it is easy to forget the large role of the public in sponsoring R&D, and that
public sponsorship is an alternative to private investment in R&D. According
to the National Science Foundation (2000), in 1998 about 30% of U.S. re-
search was funded by the federal government alone. This raises the question
of why and when R&D should be funded publicly and put in the public do-
main, rather than made proprietary under intellectual property rights. The
rationale is asymmetric information; see Gallini and Scotchmer (2001) for a
summary of arguments to this e®ect.
If ¯rms and sponsors have the same information about which invest-
ments should be supported, then public sponsorship dominates intellectual
property as an incentive mechanism, because innovations can be put in the
public domain, and avoid deadweight loss. However, when ¯rms have better
information about the value of investments, public sponsorship can lead to
bad decisions about what to invest in, and sometimes to ine±ciency in in-
vestment activities. There are two natural ways to model this tradeo®. One
is to recognize that public sponsorship is less good at satisfying consumer
preferences than private sponsorhip. The other is to assume that investment
16by public sponsors is more expensive. In this model I shall assume the latter.
In order to have a tractable model, I shall assume that the total cost of all in-
novations in country i is given by a function ki whose arguments are (fi;s i).





resent the partial derivatives with respect to the ¯rst and second arguments,




@sa > 0. The total cost of R&D investment de-
creases with the fraction that is private, and increases with total investment.
It is also natural to assume that the marginal cost of innovation,
@ka(¢)
@sa ,i s
nonincreasing with the fraction that is private,
@2ka(¢)
@sa@fa < 0: In order to solve




I shall investigate the preferred extent of protection fa for country a (sym-
metrically for other countries) under three hypotheses about the international
treaty. As a benchmark, the ¯rst is \autarky": protection is available in a
given country only if the ¯rm is domiciled in that country. The second is
a treaty stipulating national rights to foreign innovators, but allowing that
the levels of protection can be chosen independently. Thus the pro¯t ¼a is
available to any protected invention in country a, whether by a foreign or
domestic inventor. The third hypothesis is that, in addition to providing
foreign rights, the countries must harmonize on a common level of protection
f.
My objective will be to compare the R&D spending and levels of protec-
tion that arise under the three regimes with that which is optimal. In order
to de¯ne what is optimal, I de¯ne a \global" welfare function, accounting
for the externalities that each country confers on the other, and assuming



















The optimal level of R&D spending for i = a;w are ¹ sa(fa;fw); ¹ sw(fa;fw)
















i)=0 ( 7 )
Taking these levels of spending into account, the optimal (fa;fw)m u s to p t i -
mize G((fa;fw); ¹ sa(fa;fw); ¹ sw(fa;fw)): Then the optimal fa solves the fol-
lowing, and the global optimum is (fa,fw), where fw solves the symmetric
equation for w:
¹ f









i(¢)) = 0 (8)
I describe what happens under autarky, national rights with independent
choices of protection, and national rights with harmonized protections. I will
then compare them with what is optimal.
4.1 Autarky
Under autarky, the consumers in each country receive a large externality
from both public sponsors and private inventors in other countries, since
all other countries' innovations can be adopted at competitive prices. The
uncompensated externality from each country to the others will undermine
the incentives to invest of both public sponsors and private inventors, but
will not necessarily bias a country's preferred IP policy in either direction.
Country a's objective function W A
















18Under autarky, country a will prefer the mix of public and private sponsorship
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@ka( ^ fa; ^ sa( ^ fa))
@f
=0 ( 1 1 )
By the ¯rst condition, the level of R&D spending will be increased to the
point that the social value, which is consumers' surplus less deadweight loss
for the fraction that are proprietary, is just balanced by the cost of the
marginal innovation. By the second condition, there will be enough private
invention so that the reduction in cost that would be a®orded by making the
marginal invention private rather than publicly sponsored is just balanced
by the deadweight loss that would accrue.
As will be clear when I specialize to the symmetric case below, the main
problem with autarky is that it gives de¯cient incentives to spend on R&D,
relative to the global optimum. There will be de¯cient spending because
neither country accounts for the bene¯ts it's own spending confers on foreign
consumers.
4.2 Reciprocity with Independent Choices
Now consider a treaty that provides for national treatment of foreign in-
ventors, but each country chooses its level of protection independently of
the other, as in the original Paris Convention. Reciprocity should increase
the overall incentive to invest in R&D, but how will it a®ect the amount of
protected subject matter?
19Country a's objective function is now W I (\I" for \independent" choices),
given as follows:
W I




















The inventions that go into the public domain for competitive supply, yielding
consumers' surplus ca are the (1¡fa)sa publicly sponsored inventions made
in country a and the (1 ¡ fa)sw publicly sponsored inventions made in the
rest of the world: This is the ¯rst term. There are fa sa inventions in country
a which are proprietary, yielding consumers' surplus Ca plus pro¯t ¼a.T h i s
is the second term. The third term represents the fasw inventions from the
rest of the world which are proprietary in country a, yielding consumers'
surplus Ca. The fourth term represents the pro¯t collected by country a0s
inventors from the rest of the world.
Under national treatment with independent choices, the countries will
choose the levels of protection (fa;fw) in a Nash equilibrium, knowing that
both will then choose their R&D spending, ~ sa(fa;fw); ~ sw(fa;fw): For coun-






























20and similarly for w.
The optimal fa; conditionalon fw, maximizes W I
























@sa =0 ; the derivative
@~ sa(fa;fw)
@fa does not appear
in this equation :
Comparing (13) with (7), it is indeterminate whether, conditional on
(fa;fw), country a will overspend or underspend on R&D, relative to the
global optimum. Country a does not take account of the externalities it
confers on consumers abroad, but on the other hand, it takes account of
pro¯t earned abroad on its own inventions (the term fw ¼w in (13)). Whether
spending is too high or too low depends on how these compare.
Comparing (8) with (15), it is also indeterminate whether country a will
have stronger or weaker protection fa than is optimal. The two extra terms
in (15) represent, ¯rst, the fact that stronger domestic protection lets pro¯t
leak out to foreigners, due to national treatment, and, second, the stimu-
lus for spending abroad which creates positive externalities for country a's
consumers (the third term in (15)).
In the example below with symmetric countries, these indeterminacies
are resolved in the direction of too little spending and too much protection.
However that is a feature of the example.
214.3 Reciprocity with Harmonization
Under a system of harmonized national treatment, both countries must adopt
t h es a m el e v e lo fp r o t e c t i o n ,f. Each country's preferred level of protection
is the one it would lobby for, but it must, in the end, implement a level
of protection that is the outcome of a negotiation. Under this hypothesis,
country a's welfare function is W H (\H" for \harmonized"); is de¯ned by
W H
a (f;sa;sw) ´











a)( 1 6 )
and symmetrically for w. The ¯rst term represents the consumers' surplus
in country a available from publicly sponsored innovations in both countries.
The second term represents the consumers' surplus in country a on propri-
etary innovations supplied by both countries and protected in country a.T h e
third term is the pro¯t earned by inventors in a in both countries.
Under national treatment with harmonization at level f, the country a





























Since the two countries do not choose their levels of protection indepen-
dently, it does not make sense to consider a Nash equilibrium, but instead to
22assume that the countries will negotiate a solution, each having a ¯rst-best
preference. Country a's preferred f (the one that country a would lobby for)
maximizes W H








a ¡ _ s
a(f)¼











Comparing (15) and (19), country a has incentive to choose stronger intel-
lectual property rights under harmonization than with independent choices.
This is for two reasons. First, since rights will be harmonized, domestic ¯rms
can recoup more of their costs by charging proprietary prices abroad (this
is the term _ sa(f)¼w in (19)). This o®sets the fact that foreigners are re-
couping part of their costs by charging proprietary prices in country a under
the national treatment provision, whether or not the rights are harmonized.
Second, an increase in harmonized rights stimulates foreign R&D spending
more than a unilateral strengthening of rights. The increased R&D generates
positive externalities for country a.
The two countries will generally prefer di®erent common levels of protec-
tion. The common level of protection preferred by w will satisfy condition
(19) with the superscripts reversed. The second term in (19) is positive or
negative according as ¼a=sa >¼ w=sw or vice versa. Thus the second term
will have opposite sign for the two countries. If the deadweight loss, cost
structures, and impacts on foreign investments are the same in each coun-
try, then the two countries have di®erent preferences for the common level
of protection, depending on the pro¯t available to them in their respective
foreign markets.
It is also of interest to compare the optimal levels of protection, de-
scribed in (8), with the harmonized levels that the countries would lobby
23for, described in (19). If the countries did not anticipate the e®ects on for-
eign spending (i.e., ignoring the term
@sw
@f in (19)), then their incentives to
strengthen protection would be similar to the optimum, except to the extent
that their foreign pro¯t opportunities di®er, as explained in the previous
paragraph. However, there will be further impetus to strengthening prop-
erty rights if there are positive e®ects on foreign R&D spending. Thus it will
generally be the case that harmonized protections are stronger than optimal.
This point is made more reliably in the next section, where I specialize to
t h es y m m e t r i cc a s ew i t has p e c i ¯ cc o s tf u n c t i o n . 4
4.4 The symmetric Case
The easiest way to sort out the biases that come from harmonization and
independent choices is to study the symmetric case where countries a and w
are exactly alike, ca = cw = c; Ca = Cb = C; ¼a = ¼b = ¼; ka = kw = k.
Further we will choose a cost function such that the Nash equilibrium with




For each f,l e t
s
G(f) ´ ¹ s
a(f;f)=¹ s
w(f;f)=2 f(c ¡ f(c ¡ C)+f¼)
s
A(f) ´ ^ s
a(f;f)=^ s
w(f;f)=f(c ¡ f(c ¡ C)+f¼)
4The result is hard to prove generally, since the incentive to strengthen protection
depends on the level of R&D spending, which is also endogenous. There will generally be
less spending than is optimal, and this changes the incentives to strengthen protection,
due to the negative cross-partial of the cost function.
24s




w(f;f)=f(c ¡ f(c ¡ C)+2 f¼)
(20)
That is, sG(f) is the level of spending in each country that would be glob-
ally optimal, taking account of global externalities, if both countries chose
a protection level f. It solves (7) at f = fa = fw. sA(f)i st h el e v e lo f
spending that each country would choose if both have the level of protection
f, and neither receives intellectual property rights in the other country. It
solves (10) at f = fa = fw:s IH(f) is the level of spending that each coun-
try would choose if both have the level of protection f, and each receives
reciprocal rights in the other country. This level is the same, regardless of
how the level f is chosen, e.g., independently by the two countries, or under
a harmonized regime. sIH(f) solves (13) and (17) at f = fa = fw:
The following is immediate:
Proposition 3 With symmetric economies and the same intellectual prop-
erty regimes f, each country will spend less under either autarky or national
treatment than is optimal. Each country will spend less under autarky than
under a system of national treatment. That is, sA(f) <s IH(f) <s G(f):
But this proposition does not speak to the question of most interest,
namely, the e®ect of autarky and national treatment on the levels of IP that
will be chosen.
Let fG be the optimal level of protection in each country, when the global
externalities are accounted for, and the level of spending will be sG(fG): The
level of protection fG solves (8). Let fA be each country's preferred level of
protection under autarky. It solves (11). Let fI be each country's optimal
level of protection under a system of reciprocal rights where each country
25chooses its level of protection independently. It solves (15). Finally, let fH
be each country's optimal level of protection under the system of reciprocal
rights when both must choose the same level. It solves (19).
In the following proposition the condition c<3(c ¡ C ¡ ¼) ensures that
fG < 1: It is not optimal for all types of inventions to receive intellectual
property.
Proposition 4 Assume c<3(c¡C ¡¼): The preferred levels of protection
f satisfy fG = fA <f I <f H: That is, the system of national treatment will
give countries an incentive toward overprotection, and the overprotection is
exacerbated under harmonization.




3(c ¡ C ¡ ¼)
= f
G:
With the cost function chosen, the symmetric Nash equilibrium for in-
dependent choices is unique, and the ¯rms' objective functions are concave.
At the symmetric equilibrium, each ¯rm's independent choice satis¯es (15),
evaluated at (fI;fI): Nash equilibrium satis¯es the following if there is a
solution fI 2 (0;1):
0=¡2s
IH(f








The value of the righthand side is positive at fI = 0, hence there is no Nash
equilibrium at fI = 0. In fact the value is positive for all fI 2 [0;c=3d];
hence there is no Nash equilibrium such that fI · fG: Further, there is
26at least one symmetric Nash equilibrium. There is either a solution to the
above equation, or the value is positive at all fI; hence the symmetric Nash
equilibrium is fI =1f o rb o t h¯ r m s .
It remains to show that fI · fH: If fH =1 ,t h i si si m m e d i a t e ,s ow e
suppose there is an interior solution to (19), evaluated at (fH;fH):
0=¡2s
IH(f













H)( 2 2 )
At each fH, the value of the righthand side of (22) di®ers from the righthand
side of (21) by the bottom line of (22). Using (20), the bottom line is positive;
hence at fH = fI, each ¯rm has an incentive to lobby for more property
protection. ¤
Thus, treaties that require national treatment of foreign inventors can en-
courage stronger protection than is optimal, and this e®ect is greatest when
protection regimes must be harmonized. We should keep in mind, however,
that the overall level of spending is too low under any regime in which coun-
tries do not account for the external bene¯ts of their inventions. This is shown
in Proposition 3. Expanding the subject matter that is protected will gen-
erally stimulate R&D spending. With more subject matter protected, more
costs can be exported by charging proprietary prices abroad, and therefore
t h en a t i o na saw h o l es h o u l db ew i l l i n gt os p e n dm o r eo nR & D ,e s p e c i a l l y
if some of the output is protected. Hence the overprotection pointed to in
Proposition 4 has a justi¯cation.
275 Conclusion
Economic theories about the optimal design of intellectual property involve
a balancing of consumer losses due to proprietary pricing against ¯rms' in-
centives to invent. The balancing is not because inventors per se should be
weighed in the social calculus, but because inventors must be protected in
order to create bene¯ts for consumers.
The policy prescriptions suggested by such a calculus are not implemented
in a fragmented world connected by trade. National policies in a fragmented
world create externalities that are not accounted for. These externalities
cause trade negotiators to weigh the interests of inventors directly in their
welfare calculations, since inventors can become the recipients of cash trans-
fers from abroad. But the value created for consumers abroad is not counted
at all, since consumers abroad are not part of the constituency. Thus, we
would not expect the intellectual property prescriptions of trade negotiators
to accord with those indicated by considering a more comprehensive notion
of social welfare. This raises the question of what biases are introduced.
The main consequence of a fragmented world is that the system of rights
c a nb es k e w e dt o w a r dm o r ei n t e l l e c t u a lp r o p e r t yt h a nw o u l db eo p t i m a li ft h e
world were integrated. The expanded property rights will encourage private
¯rms to undertake R&D in order to earn pro¯t abroad. In contrast, there
will be too little public spending, since public sponsors are only interested
in domestic consumers' surplus. Since private, but not public, spending
can be encouraged through intellectual property rights, the expanded rights
are a partial remedy to the fact that R&D spending is suboptimal in a frag-
mented world. A better remedy might be international agreements on public
spending for R&D, rather than negotiating treaties to strengthen intellectual
property rights.
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